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The species concept is one of the central concepts in biological science. Although 
modern systematics speculates about the existence of a complex hierarchy of nested 
taxa, biological species are considered particularly important for the active role 
they play in evolution. However, neither theoretical biologists nor philosophers 
of biology have come to an agreement about what a species is. In this chapter, we 
address two questions pertaining to biological species: (1) are they individuals or 
universals? and (2) are they bona fide or fiat entities? In section The Species-as-
Individuals View, we illustrate the reasons that have led many scholars to support 
the view that species are individuals. In the next two sections, we show that the 
relational concepts of species – on which the species-as-individuals view is based – 
provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for species membership. 
This seriously undermines the species-as-individuals view. In the section A 
Conceptualist Model for the Metaphysics of Species, we advance the proposal that 
species are fiat concepts (and thus, universal entities partially dependent on the 
human mind) carved in a multi-dimensional space representing the properties 
that the biological organisms possess. The final section concludes.
The species-as-individuals view
In the Aristotelian tradition, species are regarded as kinds, that is, as universal 
entities, predicated of individual substances that characterize their essence (for 
instance, the essence of being a dog). An individual substance (consider our 
cat Kurt as an example) instantiates a natural kind. The existence of the natural 
kind ‘cat’ depends on the existence of particular cats; however, the fact that Kurt 
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lacks gills, for example, depends on his essence − his being an instance of the 
kind ‘cat’. In this view, the offspring of a couple of organisms belonging to a 
species can diverge from their ancestors only by contingent characters. Essential 
and defining characters must remain the same through generations. Therefore, a 
species is defined as the set of traits that are regarded as sufficient and necessary 
for being a member of that species.
Darwin’s theory of evolution has provided a framework in which the 
Aristotelian concept of biological species seems odd for many reasons. In Darwin’s 
evolutionary view, in principle, every character of an organism can disappear in its 
offspring. Moreover, the distinction between defining and contingent characters 
disappears; every character can change, and none is necessarily constant through 
generations. When a character changes, it is difficult to decide whether it was a 
defining character of the species (so that the species evolved into another one) 
or whether it was contingent (so that the species remained the same). Every 
character is not stable in principle; therefore, the distinction between defining 
and contingent characters is not easy to trace. In the evolutionary framework, it is 
difficult to define a species as a set of necessary and sufficient traits because every 
trait can vary in an almost limitless way, and none seems to be essential.
Therefore, some alternative definitions of biological species have been 
formulated, and these are not grounded in the characters possessed by singular 
organisms but rather in the relations among members of the same species. In 
particular, two kinds of relations have received attention: interbreeding relations 
and genealogical relations among organisms. Interbreeding relations are at the 
basis of the biological concept of species.1 According to this concept, a species is a 
group of individuals that can breed together and are reproductively isolated from 
other organisms.2 The gene flow among members of the same species and the lack 
of gene flow with members of other species contribute to preserving the genetic 
pool of the species as relatively constant by recombining the genes of deviant 
individuals with those of conspecific individuals and protecting the genetic pool 
from the introgression of genes belonging to individuals of other species. In this 
way, the most favourable combinations of genes are preserved, and the production 
of too many disharmonious, incompatible gene combinations is prevented.
Another concept based not on the intrinsic properties of the members but on 
their relationships is the phylogenic concept. The basic idea is that an individual 
is a member of the species S only if it descends from another individual of S. 
However, we cannot speak of a unique phylogenetic concept of species but rather 
a family of concepts related to each other but having remarkable differences. 
In particular, a phylogenetic concept is incomplete unless it is not specified 
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when a speciation episode occurs, that is, when an individual descending from 
a member of S is no longer a member of S. If this is not specified, the definition 
has the consequence that every descendant of an individual belonging to S is 
a member of S, and thus, that speciation is impossible. In this framework, the 
arising of a new species can be indicated either by the reproductive isolation 
of a community of individuals from the other descending members3 or by the 
appearance of a new particular trait that is not present in the ancestors of an 
individual.4
These relational concepts of species favoured a new ontological view of species 
that are no longer regarded as abstract kinds instantiated by singular organisms 
but as complex individuals composed of singular organisms. As Ghiselin (1974) 
argues, species are similar to firms. To decide whether a person is employed at a 
certain firm, we do not have to observe his or her features but rather the relations 
between him or her and the other employees of that firm. Consequently, a firm 
is not a species instantiated by its employees – it is a complex individual whose 
employees are parts linked by some relation. Indeed, the unity of the firm is due 
to the relations among employees. The same can be said about species. In order 
to evaluate whether an individual belongs to a biological species, its features are 
merely an indication. What is decisive is the relations between the individual and 
the other members of the species. It is, therefore, natural to consider a species as 
a complex individual whose cohesion is determined by the relations among its 
members. Besides firms, biological species can be compared to other complex 
individuals whose unity is due to the relations among their members, such as 
musical bands, associations or families.5
To conceive of species as individuals has further advantages. According 
to the theory of evolution, biological species have a temporal beginning and 
a temporal end, evolve and change. Abstract entities (such as universals) are 
usually conceived as timeless and, thus, as entities that have no beginning and 
no end and cannot undergo changes and transformations. Many scholars have 
concluded that biological species cannot be kinds and that every attempt to deny 
this was anti-evolutionist and fixist because it would have implied the negation of 
the thesis that species evolve. A natural conclusion is that species are individuals 
because, unlike universals, individuals can have a temporal beginning, can have 
a temporal end and can change. Peter Simons sums up the question as follows:
Modern evolutionary biology is based on populations of organisms. In this 
respect it is bottom–up or nominalistic, since populations are particular,  
not universal. It constitutes a definitive rejection of the platonistic conception 
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of biological kinds as ideal archetypes initiated by Plato, retained in modified 
form by Aristotle, and perpetuated by scholasticism, Linnæus, Goethe, Cuvier, 
and Owen. The gradual acceptance of evolution following Lamarck and the 
subsequent explanation of its mechanism by Darwin and Wallace mean that 
biologists can no longer sustain a top–down or typological conception of what 
constitutes a species. As to what species are, even under a single conception, 
theorists differ. The common-sense idea is that they are certain pluralities or 
collections of organisms, delimited by their interrelations. (Simons 2013, p. 278)
It is interesting to note that even a friend of natural kinds, Jonathan Lowe, 
distinguishes the notion of biological species – which he believes to be a complex 
and collective individual – from that of natural kind, which is a metaphysical 
category having to do with the structure of reality:
But perhaps we need to make a distinction, which can best be brought out by 
analogy with a related case, that of biological species. These too are said to come 
into existence and undergo change – indeed, that they do so is crucial to the 
theory of evolution. How then can species names denote universals, which are 
abstract entities and so on the present proposal timeless? The solution is to 
distinguish between biological species, which are concrete particulars consisting 
at any time of the mereological sum of their currently existing members 
(individual tigers or individual oaks), and biological sorts or kinds, which are 
universals instantiated by the members of those species. (Lowe 1998, p. 75)
To summarize, the naive interpretation of the concept of biological species as 
natural kind has been substantially revised in light of the theory of evolution. 
However, we will see in the next two sections that the relational concepts of 
species fail in many respects, and this seriously undermines the species-as-
individuals view.
The biological concept provides neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions
In this and the next sections, we show that relational criteria provide neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for being a member of a species. Consequently, 
any biological taxonomy must, at least in part, turn to the similarity among 
organisms in their classification. Thus, one of the main arguments for regarding 
species as complex individuals fails. If relations are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to ascribe an individual to a species and we need to rely on similarity 
among organisms, the analogy between biological species and complex 
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individuals such as firms or musical bands must be dismissed. Let us consider 
the biological concept first. We will show that it provides neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for being a member of a species.
Not necessary
Critics of the biological concept often highlight that it can be applied only to 
sexually reproducing organisms (Vrba 1985, Templeton 1989). This is a severe 
restriction, because most organisms on Earth are asexual but seem to display 
the same patterns of phenotypic cohesion within and discontinuity between 
species as do sexual species. Taxonomic practice has always subdivided the 
asexual world into easily defined biological taxa, as it has always done with the 
sexual world. Advocates of the biological concept can react in three ways to this 
restriction: they can claim that asexual organisms are members of no species 
(Mayr 1987); they can affirm that every asexual organism is the unique member 
of its own species since it is reproductively isolated from every other organism 
(Ghiselin 1974) or they can hold that a concept of species different from the 
biological concept should be applied to asexual organisms (Ereshefsky 2001). 
The first two solutions are hopeless in light of the fact that asexual organisms can 
be classified in species as easily as sexual organisms. Thus, the only way out seems 
to be maintaining that interbreeding relations are a necessary condition for being 
a member of a species for just a portion of the biological world: the sexual one.
However, this solution does not solve all the problems of the biological 
concept. Ehrlich and Raven (1969) argue that many conspecific sexual 
populations have little or no gene flow between them, particularly in plants, due 
to the physical distance between them. Moreover, ‘selection can override the 
effects of gene flow’ (p. 64) so that the cohesive force binding species together 
is for the most part ‘similar selective regimes’ (p. 63). The biological concept 
would overrate the importance of the interbreeding relations as a mechanism 
for preserving the unity of the species, which, on the contrary, would be largely 
caused by environmental factors. Ehrlich and Raven’s thesis is questioned by 
Ridley (1993), who states that it is not clear if selection is more important than 
gene flow; the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and, depending on the 
situation, one might be more important than the other. He concludes that ‘the 
evidence … hardly warrants any firm conclusion’ (p. 399) but that ‘selection and 
genetic flow are probably not usually opposed forces in nature’ (p. 397). Be that 
as it may, genetic flow is not a unique cohesive mechanism in sexual species, and 
perhaps it is not even the most important.
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There is another, more serious, problem with the biological concept – the 
members of a species S that cannot mate with the other members of S because 
of malformation or malfunctioning of the reproductive system, or sterility. If 
potential interbreeding were a necessary condition for being a member of a 
species, these organisms should be judged as non-members of the species S. 
This is an unacceptable conclusion. Therefore, potential interbreeding among 
conspecific members is not a necessary condition for being a member of a 
species, even if the species is a sexual one. Could advocates of the biological 
concept appeal, as they often do,6 to particular isolating mechanisms to solve 
this problem? These mechanisms are of several kinds and are usually divided in 
two classes, ‘namely mechanisms preventing the appearance of hybrid offspring 
(incompatibility of the parental forms), and mechanisms making the hybrids 
sterile and, consequently, incapable of propagating further (hybrid sterility)’ 
(Dobzhansky 1935, p. 350). One could maintain that the members of S that are 
reproductively isolated from the other members of S are isolated for mechanisms 
that are not typical of S. In other words, the isolated mechanisms that characterize 
S are not those mechanisms that isolate the members of S that cannot mate and 
reproduce with other members of S. However, since the malformed and sterile 
members of S share the particular isolating mechanisms that reproductively 
isolate the species S from other species, they can be considered members of S. 
Nevertheless, this answer is very risky for advocates of the biological concept. It 
seems to imply that being a member of S means to possess a particular isolating 
mechanism (e.g. particular forms of genitalia that prevent mating with organisms 
of other species, a particular structure of chromosomes that prevent meiosis with 
chromosomes of different species). These isolating mechanisms are structural 
properties of organisms, not relational properties. Then, species membership 
would be determined by the possession of certain structural properties. The 
biological concept would not be a relational concept but would be grounded 
in the possession of some intrinsic properties of the members of a species. This 
would be against the intents of the advocates of the biological concept, who have 
always claimed that relationships – and not intrinsic properties – determine the 
membership to a species.
Not sufficient
Many species, especially among plants,7 are not reproductively isolated but can 
cross-breed with other species, giving rise to fertile and viable hybrids. An often-
mentioned case is that of oaks, a genus with more than 400 species that hybridize 
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each other, creating new, fertile species. The new species can then hybridize 
with the parent species but remain distinct from them for long periods of time 
because of geographic barriers and a low rate of hybridization among the species 
(Burger 1975, Van Valen 1976). The frequency of the hybridization phenomena 
among different species shows that potential interbreeding is not a sufficient 
condition for being of the same species.
Another phenomenon that leads to the same conclusion is that interbreeding 
relationships are not transitive; population A can easily cross-breed with 
population B, and population B can interbreed with population C, but this does 
not mean that A can cross-breed with C. A particular case of this phenomenon 
is that of the ring species. Ring species are continuously connected chains of 
races of a species that surround a geographic region than cannot be occupied 
because it is a mountain massif, ocean or polar region. Therefore, they show a 
ring-shaped distribution around the inhospitable region. At the endpoints of this 
geographic ring, the most distant populations encounter each other secondarily. 
Here, they are no longer genetically compatible and are unable to cross-breed. 
Although they still belong to the same species, they have become genetically 
different because their common ancestor dates back far into the past and the 
mutual exchange of alleles has become scarce or has ceased entirely. A good 
example of a ring species is the greenish warbler (Phylloscopus trochiloides), a 
passerine that spread from the south of the Tibetan Plateau to both the western 
and eastern sides of the plateau. Today, the Tibetan Plateau is surrounded by 
several races of greenish warblers that are all reproductively connected to each 
other. On the northern side of the Tibetan Plateau, however, the races from 
the west and the east encounter each other; here, they are mutually genetically 
incompatible. Between the two races in the contact zone, gene exchanges no 
longer occur (Irwin, Bensch and Price 2001). In many cases of ring species, the 
different races or sub-species end up being considered different species that can 
cross-breed with the species that are geographically close but not with those that 
are geographically distant. Again, potential cross-breeding does not imply being 
of the same species.
The phylogenic concepts provide neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions
In this section, we will argue that phylogenic concepts provide neither necessary 
nor sufficient conditions for being a member of a species.
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Not sufficient
The proponents of phylogenetic concepts admit that these concepts do not 
provide sufficient conditions for species membership. The reason for this can be 
easily grasped − all living organisms likely descend from a unique organism or 
from a few organisms that lived some billions of years ago, but they obviously 
do not belong to the same species. Thus, in some cases, some organisms that 
descend from a member of the species S are not members of S. This happens 
when a speciation event occurs. Therefore, a phylogenetic concept is incomplete 
unless it is not specified when a speciation episode occurs, that is, when an 
individual descending from a member of S is no longer a member of S. If this 
is not specified, the definition has the consequence that every descendant of an 
individual belonging to S is a member of S, and thus, that speciation is impossible. 
Phylogenetic lineage is not a sufficient criterion for species membership.
The issue is that the conditions that the advocates of the phylogenetic 
concepts add require that one either belongs to the same interbreeding 
community (which, as we have seen, is not a sufficient criterion) or possesses 
some phenotypic or genotypic characteristics. If this second route is followed, 
the criterion for species membership is not purely relational anymore; rather, 
it is based also on some intrinsic properties, that is, on the resemblance among 
members of the species.
Not necessary
The proponents of the phylogenetic concepts insist on the necessity of belonging 
to the same lineage for being a member of a species. Hence, Hull (1978) offered 
a thesis in which an extinct species cannot reappear again. When an individual 
has ceased to exist, it cannot begin to exist again: ‘If a species evolved which was 
identical to a species of pterodactyl save origin, it would still be a new, distinct 
species’ (p. 349). Since the two lineages have two different origins, they must be 
considered two different species. Modern taxonomic practices tend to follow the 
origin criterion for organizing the taxa to which biological organisms belong. 
It often happens that a certain taxon is moved from a superordinate taxon to 
another one in order to obtain only monophyletic taxa.8
However, the thesis that phylogenetic concepts provide necessary conditions 
can be put into question. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose 
that on a distant planet, environmental conditions very similar to Earth’s 
allow for the evolution of organisms that are genetically and phenotypically 
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indistinguishable from terrestrial lions. Moreover, suppose that some of these 
animals are brought to Earth and begin to cross-breed with terrestrial lions. At 
a certain point, one cannot know whether an organism comes from the Twin 
Earth planet, from Earth or from a hybridization of the two races.9 According to 
the phylogenic concepts, terrestrial lions and twin lions are two different species, 
and the organisms descending from cross-breeds are hybrids of the two species. 
Moreover, the hybrids that cross-breed with the parent species give rise to new 
species. We would have several species without any possibility (genetic tests, 
morphological measurements, anatomical and physiological studies) to assign 
any individual to the species that are supposed to exist. This is an odd result.
Let us consider another thought experiment. Suppose that progresses 
in genetic engineering allow for the production of artificial life. Moreover, 
suppose that laboratory A produces a new life form starting from a certain 
genetic structure. Laboratory B buys the patent from laboratory A and produces 
organisms starting from the same genetic structure. Again, these two kinds of 
organisms are not distinguishable, both from genotypic and phenotypic points 
of view. Suppose that several laboratories produce this kind of organism and 
that they are scattered over environments. If sexual, they can freely interbreed. 
Again, according to the philological concepts, the organisms built in different 
laboratories are different species because they have different origins and belong 
to different lineages. When they cross-breed, they give rise to hybrids. But again, 
there is no possibility to distinguish the individuals when they are scattered 
in the environment. There is no test for establishing whether an organism 
originates from laboratory A rather than laboratory B, whether it is a hybrid 
between the lineages of laboratory A and laboratory B, or whether it is a hybrid 
between an organism of this kind and an organism coming from laboratory A 
and so forth.
Thought experiments have never been very popular among philosophers of 
biology. Perhaps the reason for this is that biology is a science more empirical 
than physics, where thought experiments are very common.10
However, it is not possible to dismiss arguments of this kind simply on 
the ground that thought experiments are irrelevant in biology because there 
are actually very similar cases. Furthermore, these cases are very numerous. 
Many species hybridize and give rise to other species. There could be many 
hybridization events between two species A and B that are separate in time 
and space. They can give rise to several lineages of a species C that can also be 
separate in time and space. Some of these lineages can go extinct. Others can 
evolve in a parallel and independent way if they are subject to similar selective 
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regimes. However, it is difficult to deny that these different lineages belong to the 
same species, although they have different origins. Furthermore, a hybridization 
episode between A and B can give rise to a lineage of the species C, which can 
go extinct. Afterward, another hybridization episode can give rise to another 
lineage of C. Thus, C is a species that went extinct and then began to exist again. 
Similar situations are probably very common among allopolyploid plants11 (i.e. 
plants in which homologous chromosomes are more than two and descend 
from different species), given the high number of allopolyploid species among 
angiosperms.
More rarely, two or more different and isolated populations of a species A, 
if subject to very similar selection regimes and to very similar environmental 
conditions, can separately evolve into a species B in parallel ways. In this case, 
different lineages of B have different origins. An actual example is the threespine 
stickleback. These fish live in different lakes in British Columbia and have 
followed very similar but independent evolutionary paths, which have led 
to three parallel speciation events in three different lakes of the area (Rundle 
2000).12
In addition to these biological reasons, there is another flaw in the proposed 
criteria. If species membership can be defined exclusively by the relations it 
bears with other individuals, it is conceptually impossible to determine the 
species of a hypothetical organism that is the only one of its species. Let us 
imagine that Sgrunt is the unique specimen of a kind of living being, a sort 
of monstrum. Now, Sgrunt does not exist, and very probably, mono-species 
organisms have never lived. Moreover, according to working biologists, it is 
simply meaningless to affirm that there exists a species with just one example. 
However, from the metaphysical and conceptual point of view, it would seem 
possible to ascribe a species to Sgrunt. In the end, it has a series of features 
that characterize it. But the definitional criteria of the species-as-individuals 
approach block a priori the possibility to collocate Sgrunt into a species, and 
this is suspicious.
If an organism cannot belong to a species solely by virtue of its relations with 
other individuals, it does belong to a species because of certain intrinsic features. 
But this is precisely what the species-as-kinds advocates state – it is because an 
organism has certain properties (i.e. it is an instance of a certain kind) that it is a 
member of a species. The insufficiency of relational criteria undermines the basis 
of the conception of species as complex individuals, since it pushes towards the 
view that living beings are collected in species not because of their relationships 
but by virtue of having certain features.
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A conceptualist model for the metaphysics of species
In a series of articles (2000, 2001), Barry Smith introduced an important 
distinction between, roughly, fiat and bona fide entities. In particular, he 
distinguishes between fiat boundaries, which are the outcome of an individual 
or collective intentional act, and bona fide boundaries, which are (in a sense) 
grounded in the reality of things. There is no doubt that political boundaries (for 
instance, those of some states of the United States) are fiat, while the boundaries 
of an object like a table seem to be bona fide. Behind this distinction, there is 
the old-as-philosophy topic of carving the nature at joints, that is, the question of 
realism. Achille Varzi (2001), for instance, maintained a strong conventionalist 
position: there are no bona fide boundaries, and thus, there are no bona fide 
objects. This debate is also relevant for our analysis.
Barry Smith (2001, p. 34) states that biological species are a typical example 
of fiat objects. We believe that two different philosophical theses are condensed 
in this view: the first has a metaphysical character and concerns the nature of the 
entities under scrutiny; the second has an ontological character and concerns 
the existence and modality of existence of the entities in question. Therefore, 
according to the first subclaim, biological species are individuals, that is, spatio-
temporally collocated items. Moreover, the species are scattered, not connected, 
individuals. The second subclaim – the proper ‘fiat’ part – has to do with the 
ontological dependence of species. If they are fiat entities, they strongly depend 
on cognitive human acts. In a nutshell, a world with no intentionality is a world 
with no biological species.
Now, if the arguments we advanced above are correct, Smith’s thesis in 
which biological species are fiat objects cannot be entirely endorsed. We argued 
that there are good reasons to believe that species are not individual entities.13 
However, the problems that stem from evolutionary theory and cast doubt on 
the alleged identification of biological species with natural kinds still persist. 
We arrive at a sort of stalemate. On one hand, there are good reasons not to 
consider species as individuals. On the other, even if universals, species seem to 
show no necessary and fixed features as the natural kinds. In the following, we 
will sketch a solution that tries to unify both a realist intuition (departing from 
Varzi–Smith’s conventionalism) and the data from biology.
We will assume that in the world there exist at least some biological 
properties that are bona fide entities; a nominalist would disagree, of course. 
But it is meaningful, from a philosophical point of view, that the very biologists 
advancing the species-as-individuals view admit the existence of biological 
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properties and relations.14 Any living organism exemplifies certain clusters 
of properties, intended as bona fide entities. Now, an advocate of the species-
as-kind view could identify some privileged clusters with natural kinds. This 
manoeuver bumps into the well-known problems we previously discussed. Our 
idea is to exploit the distinction between fiat and bona fide by applying it not to 
individuals or properties but to concepts. Smith (2001, pp. 141–2) discusses fiat 
concepts. We wish to extend his considerations to the metaphysics of species. 
We assume that concepts are epistemic entities (they are what we understand), 
and in this sense, they are dependent on the human mind. Classically, concepts 
can be individual (for instance, the concept associated with the proper name 
Kurt), universal (for instance, concepts expressed by predicates such as ‘is white’ 
or ‘is a cat’) and, finally, logical (as those expressed by particles such as ‘or’, 
‘and’ or ‘not’). The ontological tie between universal concepts and individuals 
is not instantiation but falling under. One could state that the reason Socrates 
falls under the concept of being wise is that Socrates instantiates the property (if 
any) of wisdom. Universal concepts are the clippings by which the world can be 
categorized. In Smith’s words,
Suppose that each concept is associated with some extended region in which 
its actual and possible instances are contained, and suppose further that this 
is done in such a fashion that the prototypes, the most typical instances, are 
located at distances in the center in proportion to their degree of non-typicality. 
(Smith 2001, p. 141)
Now, Smith’s view is that concepts are typically fiat entities, since they depend 
on the intentional acts of the subjects. This is true, but it grasps just one side of 
our proposal. What we want to maintain is that biological species are universal 
concepts and that they are grounded in the biological nature of the organisms. 
A very simplified example follows: let us imagine that there are just three 
biological properties (P, Q, R) that come up as graduated (they are determinable 
properties). For convenience’s sake, we will indicate the measure of the property 
under consideration with a number in the interval 1–1,000. Moreover, let us 
imagine that in our domain, we have just three individuals (a, b, c) that exemplify 
these properties and we have to classify them in species. The first scenario we 
consider is the following:
a : P235 Q28 R177
b : P233 Q28 R176
c : P236 Q27 R177
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Given this scenario, it is wholly plausible to consider the three individuals as 
belonging to the same species.15 Thus, we will say that a, b and c fall under 
species S because it is a fact of the matter that they instantiate a significant cluster 
of biological properties.
Unfortunately for working biologists, things are very rarely so easy. Let us 
consider another scenario:
a : P670 Q750 R800
b : P668 Q751 R20
c : P31  Q750 R802
What happens in this case? Clearly, based on these data, a, b and c cannot be 
subsumed under the same concept of species. Indeed, we have that
a and c are different concerning property P.
a and b are different concerning property R.
b and c are different concerning properties P and R.
Now, we can notice the typical fiat feature of the concept of species – it is a 
biologist’s choice to decide what the most relevant properties are. They could, for 
instance, maintain that property P is, above all, less important and then consider 
a and c as belonging to the same species. Alternatively, they can reason the same 
way about R. Another possibility is to focus on property Q and then declare 
that a and b and c belong to the same species, their differences notwithstanding. 
There are so many available alternatives open to biologists to categorize this 
scenario. However – and this is the trait that differentiates the world of living 
beings from, say, the world of geography – not all the divisions are possible. In 
this case, it is quite unreasonable to consider b and c to belong to a species (say, 
S) and a not to belong to S. And this is because it is a fact of the matter that some 
clusters of properties are instantiated and others are not. It is plausible to think 
that in cases such as the political boundaries between Wyoming and Colorado, 
there are no choices that must be disregarded in principle.
The toy model we have provided can easily be extended to a much higher 
number of properties. In particular, we can represent any determinable property 
as a dimension. So we get an n-dimensional16 space, where n indicates the 
number of properties taken into account.
In our framework, if we model P, Q and R as dimensions, we obtain a 
tridimensional space in which we can place the individuals. Each living being 
instantiates the properties P, Q and R to a certain degree; this means that in 
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the model, any organism occupies a certain position in the space. Very close 
organisms constitute clouds in the space. It is now clear why the concepts are 
seen as clippings – it is natural to consider close individuals as belonging to the 
same species, while it is odd to make partitions of the space that includes non-
homogeneous regions, empty spaces or even disconnected areas.
Nevertheless, there are doubtful cases. For example, some individuals can 
be far from the centre of a cloud; they are borderline cases. In this scenario, 
biologists have to decide whether to cut the space with a concept of species 
that includes the case under scrutiny or consider it as belonging to another 
species. Then, although they are grounded in re, the concepts of species 
are vague.
Let us see how our framework accounts for the evolutionary phenomena. 
From a merely ontological point of view, what mutates from generation to 
generation is the exemplification of some biological properties (think about 
determinable properties as, for example, ‘having an olfactory system that is 
sensitive to a certain kind of pollen’). With the passage of time, the conceptual 
clipboard, that is, the species Felis Catus, no longer encompasses the majority 
of the descendants that now instantiate different properties. Therefore, it is 
natural to select the cluster of individuals in a different way. The origin of a 
new species is precisely the acknowledgement, on a conceptual level, of a new 
clipping in the space of biological properties and individuals. Analogously, 
extinct species, such as Tyrannosaurus Rex, are concepts under which no 
living organisms now fall. They are classifications of properties with no 
instances. But, if in a Jurassic Park laboratory, a scientist created animals ‘in 
vitro’ that exemplify the cluster of properties subsumed under the species 
Tyrannosaurus Rex, these animals are really members of the species in 
question. A similar consideration could be made for the hypothetical case of 
alien species.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we discussed the metaphysical interpretation of the concept of 
biological species. One of the reasons to adopt the species-as-individuals view 
is the preference for relational species criteria over structural ones. However, 
we have shown that relational criteria provide neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions for species membership. In order to group biological individuals in 
taxa, we need to use structural properties and the similarity among individuals. 
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Thus, one of the main arguments in favour of the species-as-individuals view 
fails. Then, we provided a framework to consider biological species as concepts 
instead of individuals or natural kinds. These concepts show both fiat and bona 
fide features. On one hand, they depend on the real instantiation of biological 
properties by living beings. However, on the other hand, they reflect the decisions 
made by biologists when evaluating the importance of properties or considering 
borderline cases. We argued that this model can overcome some difficulties that 
affect the previous views.
Notes
1 In Chapter 6 of this volume, Vogt considers biological entities as ‘causal agents 
in various biological processes’. Among them, reproduction and evolution are 
important in defining their identity.
2 For the modern biological concept of species, see Dobzhansky (1935), Dobzhansky 
(1937), Mayr (1942), Mayr (1949) and Mayr (1970).
3 Therefore, this view mixes elements of the phylogenetic concept of species with 
elements of the biological concept. Compare Henning (1966).
4 These phylogenetic concepts, which are grounded on traits that are not present in 
the ancestors of a population, mix elements of the phylogenetic concept of species 
with elements of the classical morphological concept as a set of individuals that 
instantiate some properties. Compare Rosen (1978), Eldredge and Cracraft (1980) 
and Nelson and Plamick (1981).
5 It is important to note that the biological and phylogenetic concepts of species 
do not have the species-as-individuals view as a necessary consequence. In fact, 
the species-as-kinds views that hold relations among members as a criterion of 
membership are also possible (cf. see Okasha 2002 and LaPorte 2004). However, 
it should be noted that, if the membership criterion is based on relations among 
members, it is much more natural to consider species as complex individuals whose 
cohesion is a result of the relations among the organisms that are parts of the 
species (for this thesis, cf. Crane 2004).
6 Mayr (1991) defines a species as ‘a reproductively isolated aggregate of populations 
which can interbreed with one another because they share the same isolating 
mechanisms’ (p. 186).
7 Templeton (1989) affirms that hybridization is not rare even among animals, as his 
study on mammals would show.
8 Some proposals aim even at questioning Linneaus’s hierarchy and to substitute 
it with a classification in which every taxon is monophyletic (cf. de Queiroz and 
Gauthier 1992, Ereshefsky 2001).
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9 As it often happens with biological species, one can draw an analogy between 
this example and an example concerning languages. Suppose that on a very 
faraway planet a population speaks a language indistinguishable from English 
(same phonology, morphology, lexicon, grammar, etc.). Suppose that terrestrial 
English and the English of this population are not genetically linked, but evolved 
independently. Are terrestrial English and the twin English the same language or 
two different languages? Suppose, for example, that this population moves on Earth 
and mixes with English speakers. Is it possible to hold that the two populations 
speak two different languages similar in every aspect?
10 For a criticism of the notion of thought in biology and philosophy of biology, 
compare Hull (1989).
11 For an argument along these lines, which uses allopolyploid species, compare 
Stamos (2003, pp. 237–9).
12 Vogt (see Chapter 6 of this volume) maintains that common historical origin 
can serve as a principle of connectedness that allows the delineation of bona fide 
objects. However, if the criticisms advanced here are corrected, species cannot 
be considered bona fide individuals on the basis of a common historical origin. 
Another reason why species might be seen as bona fide individuals according 
to Vogt’s criteria is that they are often considered as the units of evolution, what 
might be described as ‘the engines of evolution’ (Eldredge and Cracraft 1980; Wiley 
1981; Mayr 1982; Ghiselin 1987). Thus, their unity might be causal or functional. 
However, that species are evolutionary units is a controversial claim. Molecules, 
genes, cells, organisms, populations have been proposed as possible units of 
evolutions (cf. Brandon and Burian 1986 for discussions on this topic) and it is not 
clear which are the levels at which selection acts. For a criticism of the idea that 
species are evolutionary units, compare Ereshefsky (1991).
13 Obviously, there is a sense in which we can non-ambiguously refer to a biological 
species by meaning the individuals of that species collectively considered. But the 
problem is metaphysical − does that species coincide with the conglomeration of 
individuals?
14 Tuomas Tahko (2012) argues contra Varzi and Smith that fundamental natural 
laws suggest the existence of bona fide entities. Tahko’s examples have to do with 
quantum physics, and in particular, with the properties of fundamental particles. It 
is an open question if the same considerations can also hold for levels of reality as 
complex as those of living beings.
15 In our example, the differences among individuals are graduated using an interval 
1–1,000. There is no reason to prefer this level of distinction to one higher (or 
lower). In practice, this choice also crucially depends on the fine-tuning of the 
instruments.
16 Compare Gardenfors (2000).
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